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Abstract. This paper investigates the different types of vertical coordination mechanism and the spread institutional 
arrangements (i.e. contracting) as well as identifies opportunities to expand innovative solutions that help to create 
and maintain the linkages among the famers and downstream businesses for dairy in Romania. In particular, we 
address the various modes of access to production factors, such as capital, specific inputs and know-how, as reasons 
for the varied development of Romanian dairy supply chains and its respective actors (farmers, processors). The 
paper draws on results from a recent study supported by the World Bank. The findings are based on semi-structured 
telephone  and  face-to-face  interviews  conducted  in  January-March  2009.  The  interviews  indicate  that  large  and 
prosperous  dairy  chains  have  better  access  to  all  production  factors,  which  allows  the  strengthening  of  their 
relationships, especially in the upstream stages (farmers), and supports their competitive advantages in the domestic 
market. Many barriers exist in the domestic market, particularly for small and medium-sized dairy chains, which 
hampers their potential exploitation of particular stages in the chain. In the same way the findings indicate that 
virtually  only  large  companies  and  farms  benefit  from  public  support  regarding  access  to  capital  (EU-funding, 
governmental programs) and know-how (extension service). 
Keywords: vertical coordination, structural change, farm assistance, Romania, dairy. 
1. Introduction 
The increasing demand for high value dairy products and investments by foreign companies in processing 
and  retailing  have  led  to  a  diffusion  of  higher  quality  standards  in  Romania.  This,  together  with 
globalization and EU integration, has had considerable overall effects on the domestic agricultural sector. 
Especially, in the context of retail internationalization it can be observed that ‘western’ retailers are taking 
their own business models into the new markets (Hanf and Pieniadz, 2007; Palmer, 2005; Roberts, 2005). 
Thus, one can say modern management concepts and their demands on the business partners are exported. 
This results in the following changes: The traditional, local, store-by-store procurement must be shifted to 
centralized, large, and modern distribution centers and external specialized logistic firms must be used. 
Furthermore, modern retailers set their own private standards of food quality and safety that are often 
much higher than those of the local governments (Dries et al., 2004, Fulponi L. 2006). Moreover, the 
requirements of the newly established procurement systems demand that suppliers be able to guarantee 
both disruption-free product flows and delivery of products of a certain quality. Thus, domestic producers 
must keep up with the demanded quantity and quality or products will be imported instead. Thus, foreign 
direct investments are particularly regarded as a catalyst for vertical coordination (Gorton 2006, Swinnen 
and Vandeplas, 2008). 
In Romania, a majority of raw milk deliveries still come from smallholders (Fritzsch et al 2008, van 
Berkum  2005).  At  the  same  time,  purchaser  (retailers,  processor)  requiring  a  certain  quality  of  raw 
materials  apply  their  standards  equally  to  all  suppliers  regardless  of  their  size.  To  adjust  production 
technology and meet the higher quality standards, farmers require access to different production factors as 
well as to input and output services on reasonable terms. As Hertel (2007) indicated, “If one element of 
the set is missing, then investments in all the others will be lost or significantly reduced”. Thus, both 
private (i.e., dairies) and public (EU, Romanian government) stakeholders have recognized these needs, 
and different forms of assistance have been provided so far. These forms include support for investments 3 
in agricultural holdings and food processing (i.e., to facilitate the adoption of EU standards); setting up 
producer groups (horizontal integration); and improving vocational training for actors in the agri-business 
(knowledge transfer), (World Bank, 2005 a, 2005 b). 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the vertical coordination between dairy farmers and the downstream 
businesses  and  to  identify  opportunities  and  challenges,  as  well  as  possible  development  paths  for 
different types of dairy chains and farmers. Since smallholders face major challenges regarding access to 
production factors and hence integration within modern supply chains, the main part of the paper, as well 
as our recommendation, focus on issues affecting small dairy chains/farmers. One research question is 
whether the CAP is able to correct the market failures or rather increase the disparities among chains, 
processors and farmers. 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  The  next  section  elaborates  on  the  general 
developments  on  the  Romanian  dairy  markets  and  the  particular  actors  involved  in  the  markets 
(consumer, processors, producers, public service). The third section focuses on vertical coordination, and 
especially on the position of small farmers in modern supply chains; The results presented in this section 
are  based  on  the  semi-structured  interviews  conducted  in  January  /March  2009.  The  fourth  section 
concludes and suggests possible extensions. 
2. Characteristic of the Romanian Dairy market 
2.1 Developments on the product market 
The economic, legal, and political adjustment processes induced by globalization and EU-integration 
have had a considerable effect on the dairy sector, a market with 21.5 million consumers. The average 
consumption of dairy products is still far behind the European average, but is constantly growing as 
consumer purchasing power increases. Additionally, roughly 55% of raw milk (about 3 million tons) are 
still marked as individual consumption and losses. However, the majority of this quantity is reckoned to 
be sold on the black market. These figures indicate that there is a considerable demand for milk products, 
and hence an unexploited potential for high value products. 
In  the  retail  sector,  German  (Metro,  Rewe,  Real,  Kaufland),  French  (Carrefour,  Auchan, 
Interrex/Intermarche Group), and Belgian (Cora) retailers, all of which require IFS standards, dominate 
the Romanian market. Meanwhile, multinationals are increasingly switching their focus from Bucharest 
and other large cities (which have already reached a certain degree of saturation) to other regions, and 
they are also targeting smaller towns, depending on their profile. Regarding the processing sector, top 
international  dairy  producers  have  already  entered  the  domestic  market  via  Greenfield  investments 
(Danone, Tnuva) or acquisitions (Lactalis, Campina, Nordex Food) or both (Friesland, Hochland). Even 
some  dairies  from  eastern  European  countries  (e.g.  the  Hungarian  company  Sole-Mizo)  are  also 
considering investing in the Romanian dairy market. 
At the same time, the traditional domestic dairies still face complex challenges regarding adoption of their 
current business strategy to the changing environment. Considerable investments have been allocated to 
reconfiguring the production system (technology, management) within the firm and improving the quality 
of inputs, as well as redesigning the food chains. Because economies of scale have become an important 
factor in the milk sector, the largest Romanian enterprises strive to expand in the milk market by applying 
various growth strategies. The most common strategy is internal growth via entering more new (export) 
markets, coupled with market penetration. For example, LaDorna exports about 20% of its products to 
countries such as Greece, Great Britain, Germany, Spain, and the US, with the focus on organic products. 
Some dairies decide to expand by building a new processing plant (i.e. “Albalact” in Oiejdea) or through 
mergers and acquisitions (i.e. Albalact and Raraul). In addition to rapidly increasing revenue, this allows 
them  to  use  economies  of  scope,  e.g.  the  transfer  of  capital,  technology,  and  know-how  within  the 
company,  as  well  as  synergies  associated  with  using  common  brand  names.  However,  buy-outs  of 
relatively well-performing dairies by foreign investors still dominates in Romania; this seems to be a 
more  effective  method  of  external  growth,  since  this  gives  domestic  dairies  access  to  approved 
technologies and business concepts. Experts expect further consolidation in the dairy market via mergers 
and acquisitions. 
Increasing demand for high value dairy products attracts further investments in the production process as 
well  as  in  marketing  and  logistics.  Some  domestic  companies,  such  as  Albalact  (“Zuzu,”  “Fulga”), 4 
LaDorna (“LaDorna”), Brailact (“Brenac”), and Lacta Prod (“Paco”) have successfully managed to create 
several distinct brands in the last five years. Today their products are listed in almost all large, modern 
retailers located in urban areas. Other domestic dairies are also planning to increase their portfolio of 
products and brands. Investments into brand, reputation, and the reduction of information asymmetry 
about product quality are becoming a priority for the large companies. Thus, significant players in the 
market (foreign, domestic) use much diversified campaigns (TV advertisements, food exhibitions, etc.) 
and allocate considerable shares of their budgets to advertising and marketing activities. Tnuva, Friesland, 
and Albalact are among the companies  with very aggressive and ongoing marketing campaigns. The 
required capital for these activities is (or was) usually supplied through bank credit, SAPARD
1
 funds, and 
the company's resources. The intensive promotion campaigns generate additional demand for products, 
and  hence  strongly  increase  the  market  shares  of  those  firms.  Despite  some  successes,  some  of  the 
domestic leaders may become easy takeover targets within the next few years, which is consistent with 
the increasing consolidation process in the European market. However, local brands that have managed to 
build  significant  brand  equity  will  stand  a  good  chance  of  being  preserved  or  even  promoted  to 
international status, thereby increasing the acquisition value of their owners. 
2.2 The quality of raw milk 
The adaptation of EU hygiene rules for food of animal origin is still one of the biggest challenges for the 
majority of actors involved in the Romanian dairy market. The EU regulations contain various obligations 
for construction, layout, and equipment in enterprises (called structural requirements) and organization of 
the supply chain that requires extensive investments. Transitional arrangements based on those of the past 
were agreed upon with Romania (and Bulgaria) to ensure the smoothest possible integration into the EU. 
Of all the companies that were registered in February 2009, half of the dairies (trade companies) and 70% 
of the collecting points are still in the transition period, and hence obliged to comply with community 
structural requirements until the end of 2009 (see Figure 1). All of the collecting points in the transition 
period are located in Transilvania; most are located in Cluj County and belong to the Napolact company, 
which is owned by Friesland Romania. The share of dairies not complying with EU standards ranges 
between 48% in Transilvania (57), to more than 51% (45) in Moldova, to 60% (58) in South Romania. 
Figure 1: State of compliance with the EU standards in the Romanian dairy sector  













Source: Own illustration based on Romanian Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development. 
 
Due to the high restructuring need it is likely that until the end of 2009, more dairies and collecting points 
in Romania will have to cease business activities altogether due to delays in their modernization process. 
The  above-mentioned  figures  indicate  that  the  most  relevant  structural  changes  are  expected  in 
                                                            
1  SAPARD: Special Accession Program for Agriculture and Rural Development. 5 
Transilvania. Additionally, it is likely that the most frequently affected will be small and medium sized 
entities that are not registered - in other words, those operating in the black market. 
2.3 The structure of the dairy farming 
During the first phase of transition in Romania, there was an immediate and strong increase of individual 
farms, while on average, agricultural labor use also increased. Further, parts of the collective land were 
restituted to members and workers of collective farms. In a second phase, labor use in agriculture started 
to  decline  while  the  shift  to  individual  farms  slowed  (Swinnen  2005).  On  the  other  hand,  many 
households already possessed small plots and some animals for their own production before transition. 
Today the Romanian farm structure is still highly fragmented especially in the dairy production (see 
Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Structure of the cow milk production in Romania, April 2009 
 
Source: Own illustration based on Romanian Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development. 
In April 2009, the MAPDR reported that there were roughly 850 thousand dairy producers; 89% still hold 
one or two cows. The interviews indicated that small dairies in particular still procure the milk from these 
farmers. The procurement occurs both legally and on the black market. The majority of those suppliers 
are older farmers without a successor. Some of them do not (or are not willing to) understand the quality 
requirements  and  have  problems  with  adjusting  to  new  organizational  rules  (contracting,  farm 
economics). The delivered milk usually does not comply with the mandatory standards. The small farms 
rarely discontinue their production. Rather, they reduce their stock to one or two cows to ensure self-
sufficiency.  Relatively  low  incomes  in  rural  areas  and  rising  unemployment,  particularly  in  under-
developed regions (i.e. Carpathian region), contribute to the persistence of subsistence producers. Thus, 
part-time livestock still breeding plays a significant role in Romania. Due to the high entry barriers, those 
farmers are not expected to surpass their subsistence status. However, they can still contribute to the 
persistence of the black market. 
However, despite a general fragmentation, a gradual increase in average farm size can be observed. This 
is especially true in the case of full-time enterprises, where there is a general tendency toward forming 
fewer but larger units. Adopting the EU standards and activities of the focal companies are the driving 
forces  behind  the  dynamic  development  of  more  competitive  and  sustainable  agricultural  structures. 
Because the Romanian milk quota
2 has not yet been reached, specialized dairy farms are not restricted in 
their  growth.  Thus,  the  role  of  specialized,  large-scale  milk  producers  (>30  cows)  is  recently 
disproportionately increasing in this market. 
At the same time it is evident that the middle class (those with three to five cows) is declining, whereas 
the shares of relatively larger and smaller milk producers are increasing. Hence, a polarization in the 
                                                            
2  For the 2007/08 quota year, the total quota for deliveries to dairies in Romania was 1.34 million tons, which was 
used in 70%. There is also a separate quota of 1.72 million tons for direct sales to consumers. The registered 
direct sales indicate that 83% of the direct quota was utilized in this period. In 2008 the total production in 
Romania accounted for 5.5 million tons. This implies that about 3 million tons are still marked as individual 
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production structures can already be observed. This development is similar to processes observed in other 
countries with a similar agricultural structure.
3 
As the structure of the dairy production changes, there is an increasing tendency toward replacing the 
indirect method of milk collection with direct deliveries from the farm to the processor. However, the 
choice of the procurement channel depends on the production structure in each individual market. In areas 
that  still  have  fragmented  farm  structures  (such  as  Transilvania),  the  indirect  channels  dominate. 
Generally, this structure impedes cost reduction and quality improvement. On the contrary, in areas such 
as South Romania (around Bucharest), direct deliveries dominate. Some dairies such as Danone no longer 
procure raw milk via collecting points; today, Danone procures raw milk directly from (relatively large) 
farmers. Some additional quantities are provided by an intermediary (from another region or country). 
Likewise, other foreign investors prefer to deal with a few larger suppliers to reduce the transaction costs 
(collection/transportation costs, quality risks). For the southern portion of Romania, it can be said that the 
higher demand for quality products and hence the respective activities of retailers and leading companies 
have  had  a  significant  influence  on  consolidation  of  the  procurement  base.  The  relevance  of  milk 
procurement and the structure of deliveries with regard to direct and indirect (collecting points) deliveries 
is shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 3: Regional structure of the milk procurement in Romania in 2008/2009. 
Notes: DD: Direct deliveries from farm to dairy, CP: Collecting points. 
Source: Own illustration based on estimations of an APRIL representative. 
3 The Common Agricultural Policy 
The EU has recognized the specific needs of the NMS with regard to the restructuring demand and the 
characteristic  dualistic  structure  of  the  agri-food  markets.  Thus,  financial  aid  has  been  provided  and 
allocated to those countries to support sustainable development of this sector. Prior to EU accession, the 
SAPARD program in particular focused on the agri-food sector and rural infrastructure, and under this 
program both the agricultural administration and the beneficiaries (farmers, processors) gained first-hand 
experiences with measures similar to those provided under the CAP. The majority of these funds were 
allocated to particular stages of the marketing channel. For example, the support focuses on investing in 
agricultural holdings and food processing (i.e. to facilitate the adoption to minimum [mandatory] quality 
standards), setting up producer groups (horizontal integration), or improving vocational training for actors 
in the agri-business (knowledge transfer). However, few financial resources have been allocated to foster 
the  relationships  between  producers  and  downstream  businesses  to  create  sustainable  partnerships. 
Additionally, some studies indicate that mostly large units (farmers, processors) benefited from these 
measures due to their improved access to information and possibilities to pre-finance and/or co-finance 
the investment projects (Luca, 2007). On the contrary, for most of the small and medium-sized units, the 
reduced capacity to co-finance the investment  was one of the  main limiting  factors that delayed the 
absorption of the SAPARD funds, especially in the first period of the program’s implementation. 
                                                            
3  For example, in Poland around the time of the EU accession, the number of farms with four to five cows started 
to  decline.  Currently  (2007/2008)  it  can  be  observed  that  the  group  of  farms  with  fewer  than  10  cows  is 
decreasing. At the same time, many households still hold one (maximum two cows). The relevance of these semi-
subsistence farms continually increased in the last decade; for example, their share of the total number of milk 
farms increased from 40% in 1996 to 48% in 2007. 7 
Since Romania’s EU accession, agricultural policy implementation has been based on the CAP structure 
(two pillars). In each country, the organizational structure follows the administrative requirements of each 
of the two pillars.
4 For the NMS, additional transitional measures have been introduced into the second 
pillar, such as supporting semi-subsistence agricultural holdings undergoing restructuring and setting-up 
producer groups. Romania and Bulgaria, the newest member states, can potentially benefit from these 
measures until 2013. The objective of these measures is to improve the competitiveness of the agricultural 
sector by bringing small and semi-subsistence farms into the market (NRDP, 2008). 
4 Vertical coordination and access to production factors 
The findings discussed in this chapter are based on semi-structured interviews conducted across different 
stakeholders  in  the  Romanian  dairy  supply  chain  and  representatives  of  the  Romanian  agricultural 
administration in early 2009. 
The representatives from the dairy sector were usually processors, producers, and experts in relevant 
organizations; the goal of the survey was to identify the design of vertical coordination and the use and 
sources  of  farm  assistance  instruments  to  provide  access  to  production  factors  such  as  know-
how/information, capital, and specific inputs. Additionally, the intention was to identify opportunities and 
challenges fostering or hampering access to production factors and hence vertical coordination. 
The  conducted  surveys  indicated  that  vertical  coordination  takes  very  heterogeneous  forms  in  the 
Romanian dairy market. The main findings are summarized below. 
4.1 Spread of farm assistance instruments 
Since the investigated dairies show considerable heterogeneity with regard to the chosen quality strategy 
and hence the utilized instruments, we identified three groups: (1) key players/top 5, (2) domestic large 
and medium sized dairies, and (3) medium sized and small chains. Because the top dairies provide the 
most sophisticated instruments in the investigated sample, we consider this group (Danone, Albalact), in 
more detail while discussing the use of the farm assistance instruments in the dairy sector. 
For  the  top  dairies,  modern  retail  chains  are  the  core  distribution  channel.  The  top  dairies,  which 
sometimes take on the role of the focal firm in a dairy chain, act to escape from price competition by 
setting themselves apart and bringing quality to a differentiating parameter. The investigated companies 
(Danone, Albalact) posses their own strong brands, which enjoy excellent awareness countrywide and are 
sold in all modern retail chains in Romania. Whereas Danone distributes the majority of its products via 
retail  chains,  Albalact  also  supplies  wholesalers.  Marketing  contracts  are  used  for  all  distribution 
channels. Both companies participate in a special governmental program "milk for schools" (“cornul si 
laptele”),  which involves a relatively  stable contract  with the  local government. Danone additionally 
exports a portion of its products, currently to Moldova and Serbia. 
Despite the fact that both companies follow a premium-quality strategy and possess modern processing 
facilities,  they  still  face  significant  problems  regarding  securing  the  quality  of  raw  milk.  The  most 
significant problems concern  microbiological  standards. Indeed, Danone complies  with EU  standards 
(since 2009); however, it still must use separate processing lines and marketing channels, as 40% (Jan. 
2009) of the procured milk does not meet the EU standards. The company Albalact complies only partly 
with the mandatory standards: The new processing plant in Oiejdea (county Alba) is one of the most 
modern  in  Romania  and  approved  for  EU  trade.  Furthermore,  two  plants  from  the  recently  (2009) 
acquired  regional  dairy  company  Raraul  (counties  Cluj  and  Suceava)  comply  with  EU  standards; 
however,  some  adjustments  are  still  needed  regarding  the  quality  of  procured  milk.  The  traditional 
formerly state-owned plant in Alba Julia is still in the transition period. Thus, increasing the quality of 
raw milk is one of the highest priorities for both companies. 
Network  efficiency  is  fortified  by  the  partners’  selection  and  provision  of  assistance  to  farmers. 
Regarding  partner  selection,  especially  FDI  prefer  to  deal  with  fewer,  larger  suppliers  to  reduce  the 
transaction costs. For example, Danone now procures milk from farmers delivering at least 250 liters of 
milk a day, which indicates that the threshold (the smallest dairy farm) possess about 15 cows (assuming 
a yield of 6 thousand liters a year per cow). Additionally, according to a representative of Danone, the 
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dairy only contracts with commercial farms (=legal units) and not individual farms (=natural persons), 
since “commercial farms better meet Danone’s requirements regarding the quality, quantity and have 
better business culture” such as contract enforcement,  technical  know-how, general  understanding of 
market  economy,  and  farm  economics.  Consequently,  Danone's  procurement  structure  has  changed 
significantly over the last decade. The share of direct deliveries from farmers increased to 85% in 2009. 
The transportation risks and costs by this procurement channel are usually covered by the processor. The 
dairy does not have its own collecting points. However, it cooperates with a few independent CPs, Ltds. 
or  farmers’  associations  (see  Figure  4a).  The  transportation  of  this  milk  (including  costs  and  risk 
assurance) is outsourced to independent conveyors. The share of the milk deliveries from those CPs on 
the total milk procurement is 5%. 
Figure 4: Vertical coordination and farm assistance instruments in the dairy sector in Romania, 2009 
 
Notes: F: farmer; MM: Middleman; CP: Collecting Point; PP: Processing Plant; I: Imports; C: Customer. 
Source: Own illustration based on conducted surveys, 2009. 
Another way to fortify network’s efficiency is to provide assistance to farmers. Building and maintaining 
the leading position with regard to quality production requires a development of adequate governance and 
mechanisms, relationship-specific investments, and initiatives for necessary changes in the partnership 
structure.  The  largest  dairies  use  different  mechanisms  (instruments)  to  induce  incentive-compatible 
behavior  in  the  upstream  stages.  Generally,  bilateral  contracts  dominate  at  the  procurement  stage. 
However,  a  representative  of  the  APRIL  indicated  that  the  Romanian  dairies  usually  use  bilateral 
contracts in a triangle scheme (between processors and farmers on one side and between processors and 
other entities on other side). 
Bilateral contracts with farmers include several elements regarding quality issues, delivery obligation, and 
arranged farm assistance instruments. Both dairies contract with farmers in writing and usually use long-
term (more than one year) and medium-term (annual) contracts with all farmers, regardless of their size. 
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Both dairies provide special assistance programs to farmers. The programs include technical assistance 
(vocational training)  to directly  support farmers by introducing and applying  modern techniques and 
technology. Additionally, Danone provides an extension service, which includes cows’ feeding plans, 
herd  management,  and  more.  In  some  cases,  Danone’s  extension  service  takes  an  indirect  form,  for 
instance, giving farmers feedback on a business plan (see below). 
Once the company sets assistance instruments, two conditions need to be fulfilled. First, the processor 
needs sufficient funds and cash flow to finance the arranged instruments with suppliers. Second, the 
processor  needs  to  enforce  the  (new)  contracting  system.  The  first  factor  seems  to  have  declining 
relevance  with  the  progressing  development  of  financial  institutions  and  increasing  offers  of 
governmental and private support. Additionally, the interviews indicate that large companies have better 
access to credits and various kinds of alternative financial means. Because contract enforcement is still a 
significant  problem  in  Romania,  the  top  two  investigated  dairies  prefer  to  focus  on  instruments  that 
address short- and medium-term financial assistance. 
For example, both dairies (i.e., Danone, Albalact) provide short-term ‘symbolic’ financial assistance for 
operating resources such as feed compounds and energy costs to overcome temporal illiquidity, faced by 
some  farmers,  usually  during  the  winter.  The  dairy  buys  the  farmer’s  estimated  milk  production  in 
advance, providing the farmer with respective bar money or cash remittance (Danone). In return, the 
farmer draws an order check (voucher), which the dairy can cash by the farmer’s bank if he or she does 
not deliver the ‘contracted’ milk. The partners (farmer, dairy) use the traditional (bilateral) contract and 
supplement it with the additional pre-payment agreements, usually in form of an appendix. The farmer 
pays back the commitments with milk deliveries. The duration of pre-payment is usually one or two 
months. 
Another type of assistance refers to specific inputs such as feed compounds, detergents, medicines or 
other veterinary service, and machinery. In this case, Danone applies triangular contracts. The special 
agreements involve three entities: Danone, the farmers, and the companies delivering goods and services 
to the milk sector. Based on this contract, farmers can purchase the respective goods or services directly 
from  the  indicated  input  provider.  Danone  pays  for  the  respective  goods  and  service  at  the  time  of 
purchase. The farmer repays the financial obligations to Danone by milk deliveries, usually within one 
year. However, one respondent indicated that large farmers are generally preferred, as far as access to the 
financial assistance is concerned. Additionally, in some cases farmers even have an influence on the 
choice of the inputs provider. In this case the farmer receives the respective money from the dairy or asks 
the dairy to pre-pay the respective inputs. In some cases, however, the farmer selects cheaper inputs; 
however, low quality feed can negatively affect the quality of raw milk. Indeed, being informed about the 
production technique is important for the dairy processor since it decreases the probability of the incorrect 
allocation of raw material to a production line. 
There is evidence that some dairies no longer wish to act as financial institutions. This is especially true 
with regard to long-term investments in specific resources such as equipment (cooling, milking) as well 
as the purchase of animals; some dairies refuse to provide these respective credits to farmers. Whereas 
Albalact  still provides credits for purchase of animals directly to a farmers, Danone  acts only as an 
intermediate between the farmer and bank and provides a loan guarantee to the bank. For this reason, 
Danone’s suppliers  first  must develop a convincing business plan. Danone  usually do not  help their 
farmers to develop their business plans; however, it assists selected suppliers in improving or updating 
their plans. The processors’ acceptance of the plan is very important for the farmers, since this increases 
his or her credibility in view of the bank, and hence usually his or her access to a discounted interest rate 
for specific investments within given programs (i.e., Fermierul Programme). 
4.2 Access to input and output markets 
Access to quality control service 
The interviews indicated that (some) farmers (chains) have restricted access to any kind of veterinary 
support  and  quality  control,  even  those  which  are  required  by  law.  The  production  holdings  should 
undergo  periodic  inspections  to  ensure  that  the  nationally  regulated  hygiene  requirements  for  the 
production of raw milk are fulfilled. For example, a milk holding is given an appropriate health certificate 
as a result of a positive inspection To our knowledge, only a small share of farmers possess an appropriate 
certificate, which indicates considerable quality risks at the procurement stage. 10 
The farmers in Romania generally have three alternatives for control of his raw materials:  
1) The farmer can receive the respective service free by the milk processor. However, the large processors 
(initiators of contracting) have their own quality system, including a lab and milk inspectors. The milk 
inspectors (employed staff) usually monitor and assist farmers at their request. Thus, farmers delivering 
their products to processors that provide this service have certain cost advantages. 
2) The farmer can use the service of the Veterinary Sanitary County Department (DSV), which can be 
provided at least once per month. However, this service is not free. Some respondents mentioned that the 
service provided by DSV is “very expensive”; the subjective costs assessment indicates that the threshold 
for  this  service  is  too  high  for  many,  in  particular  the  less  profitable  farmers  and  firms.  Thus,  the 
alternative for those entities is to ‘have a trusted man’ at the collecting point or to operate on the black 
market. Some respondents (usually from domestic chains) argued that because some quality standards and 
controls are obligatory, the government should enforce these regulations, and at least provide a minimum 
of the service for free. It must be noted that historically, farmers did not have to pay for this service; thus, 
some still feel that they should not have to. 
3)  The  farmer  can  use  the  service  of  an  independent  lab.  However,  according  to  the  APRIL 
representative, there is just one independent lab in Romania, located in Cluj. The lab was established by 
Dutch investors and is operated and managed in collaboration with the DSV in Cluj as an NGO. The price 
charged by this independent service is five times smaller than the DSV price. We did determine whether 
there is another interdependent lab in Romania, since no other respondents mentioned use of such a 
service. The interpretation is that either there is just one (or just few) of them, and hence equal access by 
the numerous farmers is hardly possible. Alternatively, the stakeholders in the milk chain are not well-
informed  about  the  private  service  possibilities,  which  would  indicate  the  existence  of  asymmetric 
information, which again hampers the effective development of the chain. Because quality controls in 
independent institutions are both efficient and equally beneficial, establishment of similar independent 
labs should be encouraged. 
Access to know-how 
The provision of a technical advisory service appears to be more effective in well-functioning supply 
chains. Whereas the top companies usually provide a well-structured extension service and vocational 
training, the large and medium-sized domestic dairies focus on “informal information exchange” and 
usually give “…oral advice to farmers who wish to expand their milk holdings and specialize stronger in 
milk production,” (respondents’ answers). It also holds that the larger the farm, the larger the processor’s 
willingness to advise the farmer. Respondents that represent small chains claimed that neither processors 
nor farms receive any kind of technical advice. It is interesting to note that the majority of small and 
medium-sized  processors  did  not  consider  providing  and  do  not  wish  to  provide  education  to  their 
suppliers. They indicated, however, that “…the system should solve the major problems first,” while 
providing more extension services and vocational training to the farmer. In some cases, they indicated 
that even education on basic farm economics and business culture is needed. 
Access to capital 
In order to exploit the full potential of the value chain, the initiators of contracting require sufficient funds 
and cash flow to finance the arranged instruments with suppliers. Again, the prosperous dairies have 
better access to financial sources originating from both i) private and ii) public providers. 
We  found  that  farmers  and  processors  linked  to  foreign  investors  have  the  best  access  to  capital. 
International  foreign  investors  (Danone,  Firesland)  have  access  to  their  own  companies'  capital. 
Furthermore,  we  found  that  domestic  processors  who  have  links  with  international  finance  through 
contracts  with  international  companies  (such  as  Fiesland/Napolact  and  Covalact/Campina)  can  more 
easily  access  money  from  the  parent  company.  Our  findings  suggest  that  only  a  part  of  domestic 
companies  and  farms  benefit  from  governmental  support.  The  interviews  indicated  that  small  and 
medium-sized  dairies  have  restricted  access  to  governmental  programs  because  not  all  domestic 
companies were or are eligible for different governmental programs.  
Some of the initiatives were again hampered by the lack of capital needed to cover the farmer's own 
participation in the investment. Commercial banks usually refused to provide credits to cover the farmer’s 
own participation. The banks did not accept any farmer’s pledge or mortgage as a loan guarantee. The 
respondents mentioned that banks did not consider livestock, equipment, or buildings owned by farmers 11 
as eligible criteria for credit. The only factor increasing the farmers’ ability to secure credit was a large 
area of land. Hence, the majority of farmers are unattractive to banks. In some cases the dairies offered to 
provide respective pre-financing to the affected farmers. An interesting issue is that some of the farmers 
did not accept this offer, because they were afraid of “…becoming too dependent on both the processor 
and the bank.” 
Challenges for small chains 
The investigated small and  very  small dairy chains  usually provide  generic products at the cheapest 
possible prices. They usually distribute their products via their own outlets (60%), wholesalers and food 
services, and small shops, usually “…by its own car from gate to gate of the purchasers.” Oral contracts 
dominate. Some of the chains are not registered, as was the case of one investigated farmer-processor 
involved in black market operations. The main reason for the low competitiveness of these products and 
their marketing to small shops is the low quality of raw materials. The respondents indicated that many of 
their  suppliers  are  not  certified  producers,  and  provide  milk  quality  that  is  far  below  EU  standards. 
Additionally, the quantity produced is low, as there is a lack of both specialized dairy cow breeds and 
“…prospective to grow for small farmers”. Quality control is a challenging issue for these chains. Some 
of the dairies provide a ‘trusted’ man at the collecting point, who supports the dairy while controlling for 
quality and preventing any fraud. However, “…even if at the collecting point the quality of delivery is 
controlled (fat, protein) it does not restrain some small suppliers from ongoing cheating,” e.g. by adding 
water  to  the  milk.  To  reduce  the  hazards  of  providing  low  quality  products,  some  small  processors 
provide certain financial assistance to the farmer (e.g. financial support to renovate farmers’ residences). 
4.3 Institutional development 
The  responses  of  the  representatives  of  the  Romanian  dairy  market  argued  at  many  stages  that  the 
institutional  framework  should  still  be  improved  to  support  the  efficiency  of  market  coordination 
mechanisms. In this part of the study we consider how the business environment works. 
Our findings suggest that there are major impediments regarding the scale of the black market, contract 
enforcement as well as lack of producers’ associations.. 
On generally we argue, that the black market is not effectively addressed by governmental institutions. 
The increasing requirements  implemented  in  the course of EU accession  have intensified dairy  milk 
operations on the black market. Additionally, certain farmers and small processors avoid paying taxes, 
and hence avoid registering their business activities. Some respondents mentioned that the numerous 
middlemen  especially  contribute  to  the  persistence  of  the  black  market.  Many  of  the  interviewees 
indicated that governmental institutions must provide instruments to reduce the scale of the black market. 
It is interesting to note that the call for such solutions was not very intensive and was very seldom, even 
though the share of raw milk sold on the Romanian black market is considerable (30% to 40% of milk 
production). 
Enforcement  is  crucial  to  make  any  of  the  contracts  or  supplier-assistance  programs  sustainable. 
Enforcement  is  especially  problematic  in  environments  in  which  public  enforcement  institutions  are 
essentially absent. Evidence from the interviews suggests that all dairies – regardless of their size – face 
contract enforcement risks. For example, some farms diverted their pre-paid inputs for other uses. In other 
cases, despite being provided assistance instruments on a contractual basis, the suppliers sold all or part of 
their produce to other companies or traders. Trust is also often lacking within the large chains. Even 
within the small chains, contract enforcement is still a challenge. The small dairies usually use short-term 
(monthly) contracts with small (one or two cows) and medium (11 or 20 cows) farmers. The biggest farm 
is seldom larger than 40 cows. Contracts are mainly trust-based, even if they are written. The respondents 
indicated  that  they  do  not  pay  much  attention  to  the  formal  (written)  contract.  The  low  contract 
enforcement is also one reason that the small chains see vertical integration via the establishment of farms 
as one solution to overcoming delivery problems within one firm (internalization of market transactions). 
Thus, the government should be encouraged to create the proper institutional conditions for successful 
contracting.  Alternatively,  the  initiators  of  contracting  must  find  an  innovative  way  to  design  self-
enforcing contracts. This, however, requires extensive knowledge of the local partner. 12 
The strongest organizational body in the dairy market at the national level is APRIL,
5 which associates 
the largest processors providing 70% of the procured raw milk in Romania. Small dairies are usually not 
associated with any organization. In general, farmers do not have clear means of claiming their interests 
and there is a lack of farmers’ associations that represent small (dairy) farmers. Due to their experience 
with cooperatives during the socialist era, most farmers are skeptical of associations or producer groups. 
Farmer  and  expert  interviews  revealed  once  again  that  lacking  trust  is  still  a  problem  for  increased 
cooperation  among  farmers.  Nevertheless,  there  are  some  success  stories,  and  some  newly-founded 
farmers’ associations such as the LAPAR
6, which represent farmers' interests at the national level, but 
thus far they represent mainly large farms. However, since 2004-2005, among small farmers there is a 
slightly  increasing  positive  attitude  regarding  creating  or  joining  different  associations.  This  holds 
primarily for the sheep and goat milk producers, however, and is mostly a reaction to changes in the 
operational environment (e.g. governmental policy to reduce and stop the direct selling and selling of 
unprocessed  milk).  The  respondents  indicated  that  the  small  farmers  increasingly  see  the  need  to 
cooperate, but because they are very skeptical about any success of cooperation at the beginning, they 
need a help to overcome the ‘sticking point’ prohibiting any cooperative action. 
5 Conclusions and recommendations 
The  results  indicate  that  the  dairy  market,  likewise  the  whole  agri-food  business  in  Romania,  is 
characterized  by  a  dualistic  production  and  processing  structure;  In  dynamically  changing  market 
conditions, the relatively small chains (farmers, processors) are usually disadvantaged regarding access to 
input  and  output  markets.  Following  Hertel  (2007),  targeted  policy  interventions  that  correct  the 
underlying market failures might be win-win solutions for efficiency and equity. The development of 
(dairy) farmers requires sufficient access to different production factors, i.e., land, labor, technical skills 
and information, purchased inputs, and fixed and working capital. We found that growth for some large 
dairy producers, especially in relatively prosperous regions (Bucharest area) is increasingly restricted by 
access to additional land (only) (as in the majority of producers in Western countries). On the contrary, 
the majority of farmers and dairy chains are restricted by almost all other production factors. The majority 
are small or medium-sized units, all of them demanding a complete set of these factors of production and 
input and output services on reasonable terms. 
This situation raises three key questions: i) how can agricultural policy measures adjust to the unique 
circumstances of the New  Member States and  what are the  unique  service demands of the different 
groups of farms; ii) what strategies are needed to deal with the large number of small entities (Fritzsch et 
al.  2008)  to  help  with  adjustment  and  modernization  or  exit  from  agriculture;  iii)  how  to  increase 
competitiveness of the few medium-sized farms? 
How can the CAP effectively engage in the problem? 
Our  first  conclusion  is  that  two  years  after  accession,  the  CAP  has  successfully  supported  many 
investments to upgrade the dairy chain in Romania. However, this support seems only to facilitate the 
development of relatively large and financially strong farms and firms, which usually have sufficient 
financial means to access modern agricultural supply chains. At the same time, the traditional financial 
instruments do not help establish mechanisms to connect small producers and producer organizations with 
food  processors,  marketers,  and  traders.  Thus,  the  gap  between  the  prospering  chains  and  small  or 
medium- sized dairy chains seems to have increased over the last two years. This result questions the 
effectiveness  of  the  traditional  CAP  instruments,  which  seem  to  be  unsuitable  for  the  dualistically-
structured NMS. 
Since EU accession, the NMS have additionally benefited from transitional measures such as aids for 
semi-subsistence  farmers  and  support  for  producers’  groups.  However,  the  effectiveness  of  these 
measures  in  the  Romanian  case  seems  to  be  low  or  should  be  questioned.  For  example,  our  results 
indicate  that  the  access  of  potential  beneficiaries  to  semi-subsistence  aids  is  relatively  restricted, 
indicating this measure’s low impact. Additionally, we argue that these measures probably encourage 
some nonviable small farms  to stay in agriculture (in the dairy  market). Since the  majority of these 
farmers do not comply with mandatory EU standards, their existence contributes to the persistence of the 
                                                            
5  APRIL: Romanian Dairy Processors Association. 
6  LAPAR:Romania Agricultural Procedures Associations League. 13 
black market, which hinders the allocation of resources (i.e., land) to more effective units, and hence the 
competitiveness of the Romanian dairy supply chain. 
The case of active entrepreneur (small commercial farms) 
The  need  for  governments  to  support  commercially-oriented  small  farms  (chains)  to  exploit  growth 
opportunities is less obvious. In functioning markets, one expects that the government should stand back 
and let the ‘invisible hand of the market’ coordinate the behavior of economic agents. In theory, this 
process should ensure the optimal allocation of production factors to the most efficient commodities, 
regions,  organizational  forms  and  farm  sizes.  Hazell  et  al.  (2007)  argue  that  in  this  case,  “…policy 
interventions would focus on providing an enabling economic environment for market-led development, 
typically  by  providing  stable  and  undistorted  economic  incentives  and  essential  public  goods  and 
services”. However, our results indicate that both Romanian institutions and markets show many failures, 
which can lead to discriminatory and inefficient outcomes. 
Generally, the importance of improving the delivery of service in Romania to reduce market distortions is 
obvious. However, even with effective institutions, transaction costs cannot be reduced to zero. Looking 
at the various marketing channels in the Romanian dairy chain, a self-enforcing dualism exists: The large 
supply chains (and commercially-oriented farmers) that use direct marketing channels usually face lower 
transaction costs (higher quality, lower transportation costs per unit and quality risks). In contrast, small 
farmers whose production does not considerably exceed the subsistence level incur relatively high (per 
unit) transaction costs when selling their produce on local markets or via collecting points. 
In our opinion, the government should help maintain the dualistic structure of the dairy sector in 
Romania, due to the various advantages of such a structure (competition, landscape, job opportunities, 
etc.). These are our suggestions: 
…provide  financial  aid  to  support  niche  marketing.  Through  negotiations  with  the  EU,  Romania 
obtained brand recognition and protection for the name of origin (PDO) and geographical designation 
(PGI) of several types of products (i.e., some yoghurt sorts and semi-hard cheeses). However, there is 
need  for  a  better  understanding  of  these  protected  products,  as  well  as  a  general  regard  for  the 
‘traditional/organic agriculture’ meeting of European standards. Some respondents indicated that lacking 
know-how  and  experience,  as  well  as  the  complexity  of  applying  for  potential  aid,  are  the  major 
challenges to the development of marketable regional food production. For the producers it is important 
to change the  thinking  from a production orientation to  market orientation to successfully target the 
market niches. Additionally, the provision of additional capital is needed to first invest in the local brand 
and finally to collectively promote the local products. 
… however, target active farmers only. Effective policy measures (extension, financial support) should 
target active farmers or business starters with a high level of entrepreneurial skills and good business 
concepts. “Investing in education of farmers which are averse regarding any change is a waste of money.” 
… do not mix agricultural and social policies. Some small chains still procure raw milk from very 
small farmers (with only one or two cows). However, the quality of the milk is low, and the farmers are 
usually advanced in age and are neither flexible nor willing to adjust to changing market conditions 
(quality requirements, farm economics, contracting). The majority of these farmers do not possess milk 
quotas. Thus, for them it will be difficult to even enter the legal market. Due to these additional market 
entry barriers, it cannot be expected that those small farmers will ever be vertically integrated into modern 
supply chains. The case of the small farmers should not be the responsibility of the Romanian Ministry of 
Agriculture since they represent a social problem (“If the Ministry allocates money for them, the money is 
lost forever”). A solution for the dairy farms would be to help them diversify their production portfolios 
or to include them in the European retirement programs. 
In this context, the EC should consider an expanded range of eligible measures under Pillar II to provide 
advisory services geared exclusively  towards the needs of smallholders  who do not qualify  for farm 
payments and who may want to explore off-farm employment, or alternative enterprise options while 
maintaining a semi-subsistence operation, or to exit agriculture altogether”. After the health check of the 
CAP there are some additional opportunities to engage in, and received financial support is available to 
diversify the incomes of the rural population.  
However, at this stage one might question the role/effectiveness of the 2nd pillar measures, since some of 
them are linked to agricultural production. Since a clear differentiation between the agricultural and social 14 
(regional) policy is not given, it is likely that this structure contributes to the persistence (scale) of the 
currently observed paradigms such as the freezing of agricultural structures and the black market. Perhaps 
for the next CAP reforms (after 2013), joining the cohesion policy and the 2nd pillar measures should be 
considered (especially the measures regarding water, landscape management, etc.) to guarantee a more 
clear  direction  and  clearer  goals  of  the  particular  EU  policies.  At  the  same  time,  the  scale  of  the 
paradigms such as the freezing of agricultural structures and the black market could be reduced and the 
effectiveness of the EU policy measures increased. 
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